We introduce reactive Kripke models for intuitionistic logic and show that the reactive semantics is stronger than the ordinary semantics. We develop Beth tableaux for the reactive semantics.
Fig. 1 E1
a p → q, we must check whether there exists a higher point s to a (including a itself) with x p but x q.
The above definition is set-theoretical. The notion x A is defined inductively, and the graph of Fig. 1 without the double arrow is just a graph suggesting a Kripke model with a reflexive and transitive binary relation.
To be more precise, Fig. 1 (without the double arrow) suggests a set S = {a, b, c}, a relation R = {(a, b), (b, c) } and the reflexive and transitive closure of R being R * = {(a, a), (a, b) , (a, c) , (b, b) , (b, c) , (c, c) }. If we use an explicit formula for R * , we get: x R * y iff x = y or x Ry or for some k ≥ 1 and some t 1 , . . . , t k , we have x Rt 1 ∧ t 1 Rt 2 ∧ . . . ∧ t k−1 Rt k ∧ t k Ry.
The assignment h to the atoms is also indicated in the figure.
So the Kripke model is (S, R * , a, h), with h( p) = {c} and h(q) = ∅.
So to check whether a p → q we simply ask set-theoretically whether ∃x(a R * x and x p and x q).
To introduce the reactive approach we envisage ourselves walking along the arrows of the graph from point a onwards and at each point x that we pass, we evaluate x p and x q and compare. This is an actual walk and search along the graph.
Of course, the end result is the same. If there is an x such that a R * x and x p and x q then we will walk into it sooner or later and vice versa. Now given this 'walk along the graph' point of view, the reactive double arrow makes sense. What it does is the following: As we cross from a to b, the double arrow gets activated and disconnects the path from b to c. So we do not get to the point c where c p and c q. Without getting to c, we will report that a p → q holds, because we cannot get to the counterexample, etc. So in the reactive model of Fig. 1 with the double arrow, we have a p → q.
We now sum up. We introduced two ideas here.
1. Evaluation in Kripke models is done by 'walk along the arrows and check and report' policy. 2. Double arrows along the way can disconnect connections and control where we can go. 1 Consider now Fig. 2 . In this figure, when we walk along a → b → c we cannot continue from d to e, because d → e gets disconnected. However, when we walk along a → c → d, we can continue to e because there is no double arrow along the path.
Section 2 gives the formal definitions involved and introduces the reactive models. We also show that we get a richer semantics than ordinary Kripke models.
The idea of reactivity is a general one and can apply to Beth models as well. Beth models are like Kripke models except the inductive truth definition is different. We need the notion of an Belt anti-chain of points. Given (S, R * , a, h), and t ∈ S then a set T ⊆ S is a Belt anti-chain for t if all points of T are R * not comparable and every maximal R * chain beginning at t must meet the Belt T .
We have t A iff there exists an antichain Belt T for t such that for all x ∈ T, x A. Turning a model reactive is even easier, if we give the correct definition of a reactive path. A reactive path beginning at t is a trace of a walk along the arrows from t onwards, where all double arrows are taken into account. So hopefully we can define reactive Beth models as well.
In Fig. 2 there are two maximal reactive paths
Reactive Kripke frames
This section introduces reactive Kripke frames for intuitionistic logic and shows that intuitionistic propositional logic is complete for such frames. We also show that there are intermediate logics which are complete for a class of reactive Kripke frames but are not complete for any class of ordinary Kripke frames. Thus reactive Kripke frames is a richer and stronger semantics than ordinary frames. The above also means that we can study a richer class of intermediate logics, e.g. intermediate logics generated by finite reactive frames. We shall see in Remark 3.8 what kind of Heyting like algebras one gets from finite reactive frames.
Footnote 1 continued (c) We can have an inductively iterated version of the above. In this paper we are keeping the reactivity simple.
To appreciate the opportunities opening for us through the notion of reactive Kripke frames for intuitionistic logic, consider a famous beautiful theorem of L. Maksimova Maksimova (1977) .
• There are only seven intermediate logics which have interpolation Is this still true if we take into account logics generated by reactive frames? The notion of 'logic' may not be the same! A later section will provide tableaux for logics defined by finite frames.
Definition 2.1 (Ordinary Kripke models for intuitionistic propositional logic) A Kripke model has the form m = (S, R, R * , a, h) where S is a non-empty set of worlds and R ⊆ S × S is a binary relation on S. R * is the reflexive and transitive closure of R, 2 a ∈ S is the actual world and h is an assignment, giving for each atomic q a subset h(q) ⊆ S.
The following holds
The satisfaction relation is defined as follows, for t ∈ S and a propositional formula A. R, a, h) where S is a non-empty set, a ∈ S, R ⊆ S × S is a binary relation (not necessarily reflexive nor transitive) and S * is the set of all R increasing sequences β of elements from S of the form β = (a 0 , a 1 , . . . , a n ) such that a 0 = a and for i = 0, . . . , n − 1 we have a i Ra i+1 . We denote a n by |β|. h is an assignment giving for each atomic q a subset h(q) ⊆ S such that
We define satisfaction for β, a sequence in S * , as follows. (We need the notion of: β is an extension of β iff β is an initial sequence of β , i.e. β = (a, t 1 , . . . , t k ) and β = (a, t 1 , . . . , t k+n ) n ≥ 0). The proof for ¬A is similar.
Remark 2.5
The second type of model is easier to turn reactive. In this new type of model, we view the evaluation of A → B at a node t as 'going along the relation R and at whatever point t we reach, if t A then t B.' So in this definition we actually have to traverse the arcs of the model.
Note that R needs not be reflexive nor transitive. We get these properties from the evaluation process. So consider Figs. 3 and 4. Figure 3 gives Definition 2.6 (Reactive intuitionistic Kripke frame) A reactive intuitionistic Kripke frame has the form (S, R, a), where a ∈ S and R is a set of pairs of the form
Example 2.7 A reactive frame, see Fig. 6 . We have R = {(t, s), (t, t) , ((t, t) , (t, s))} and a = t Definition 2.8 (How reactivity operates) t,s) is the result of traversing the arc 
Let
We say β n for n ≥ 0 is a legitimate extension of β iff n = 0 or n ≥ 1 and the following holds.
• (1) above. 4. We say β 1 is an immediate legitimate extension of β.
Lemma 2.9 Let (S, R (a) , a) be a reactive Kripke frame. Let β be a legitimate extension of (a), and β = (a). Write
Proof By induction on k. For k = 1 we do have a Rt 1 .
We see from the construction of any R β that we have R β ⊆ R.
Hence if β = β * (t k+1 ) with |β| = t k and (t k , t k+1 ) ∈ R β , then we have t k Rt k+1 .
Definition 2.10 (Satisfaction in a reactive model)
1. Let (S, R, a) be a reactive frame. Let R = {(x, y)|x, y ∈ S and (x, y) ∈ R}. Let h be an assignment such that t ∈ h(q) and t Rs implies s ∈ h(q).
Let β be a legitimate extension of (a). Let R β be the corresponding relation. Let
is a legitimate extension of (a) in (S, R, a). 2. We define satisfaction as follows:
• β q iff |β| ∈ h(q), for q atomic (1) and (2) are clear. To show (3), note that β = (t, t) is a legitimate extension of (t) and R (t,t) is
{(t, t), ((t, t), (t, s)}.

In (S, R (t,t) , (t, t) we have (t, t) ¬q but (t, t) q.
Lemma 2.13
The logic defined by reactive satisfaction is intuitionistic logic. 3 Proof 1. Since ordinary pre-reactive models are reactive models, (by Definition 2.3 and Lemma 2.4) the logic is not stronger than intuitionistic logic.
2. From Lemma 2.11 we see the logic is not weaker either.
Theorem 2.14 The logic of the frame Fig. 6 is not complete for any class of ordinary intuitionistic Kripke frames.
Proof The proof has four parts, (A)-(D).
(A) (A) The following formula holds in the frame of Fig. 6 , under any h, In the first case, we have (t) x and hence (t) y → x.
In the second case we have (t, s) x, (t, s) y. Hence (t) ¬y and so (t) y → x.
(B) We now show that any ordinary frame which satisfies (1) and (2) under any h must be either a single point or the frame of Fig. 3 . This is well known because otherwise either (1) or (2) can be falsified. (1) is falsified by a 3 point chain and (2) by a two point anti-chain. So we can have neither. (C) We now show that in Fig. 3 or in a single point (3) must hold.
(a) x ∨ ¬x ∨ (¬x → x).
To falsify x ∨ ¬x we need Fig. 3 with t x and s x but from the latter it follows that t ¬¬x holds and hence t ¬x → x. (D) Our proof is concluded because Example 2.12 shows that (3) can be falsified in the frame of Fig. 6 .
Remark 2.15
It is helpful to have another view of Fig. 6 . The frame has two paths, as in Fig. 7 We can view Fig. 7 
as an ordinary 3 point Kripke model with the understanding that the assignment at t and (t, t) is the same, i.e. for every q, t ∈ h(q) iff (t, t) ∈ h(q).
This is common to reactive models, that they can be 'unfolded' as models of paths with restrictions on the assignments. Gabbay and Marcelino (2009) studies such models. We examine this notion in the next section. 
t (t, s) (t, t)
must give the same values to the atoms. This unfolding process can be done in a systematic manner, and it seems to have significance for developing Beth tableaux for reactive intuitionistic logics. So in this section we study it in detail. We are going to unfold and then fold again. Let (S, R, a) be a reactive frame. Let β be a legitimate path of the form β = (a, t 1 , . . . , t k ). We saw that we can calculate
If S is finite and β ranges over all legitimate paths, we get only a finite number of different frames F β . Let us take advantage of this.
Definition 3.1 (Path equivalence relation) Let m = (S, R, a, h) be a reactive model. Define an equivalence relation on the paths of the model as follows:
• β ≡ γ iff |β| = |γ | and R β = R γ .
Let be the set of equivalence classes, {β| ≡ | β a legitimate path extending (a)}.
Then is finite. Define ρ (respectively ρ 1 ) on as follows:
• β/ ≡ ργ / ≡ (respectively: β/ ≡ ρ 1 γ / ≡) iff for some β 1 ≡ β and γ 1 ≡ γ we have γ 1 is a legitimate extension (respectively: an immediate legitimate extension) of β 1 .
Lemma 3.2 ρ is reflexive and transitive, and is the reflexive and transitive closure of
Proof Reflexivity is not a problem. We show transitivity. 
Observe that R β 1 = R β 2 . Since γ 1 is an extension of β 1 along the sequence of nodes (s 1 , . . . , s m ) and γ 2 is the extension of β 2 along the sequence (s 1 , . . . , s m ) (same sequence) and they both start at |β 1 | = |β 2 | with R β 1 = R β 2 , then they end up at the same relation, namely R γ 1 = R γ 2 . Hence γ 1 ≡ γ 2 . We now finish the proof of Lemma 3.2: 4. Since γ 1 ≡ γ 2 and γ 1 extends α 1 , we get α 1 / ≡ ρ γ 2 / ≡ 5. Clearly ρ is the reflexive and transitive closure of ρ 1 .
Lemma 3.3 Let m = (S, R, a, h) and let ≡, , ρ be as in Definition 3.1. Consider μ = ( , ρ, a/ ≡, h), as an ordinary Kripke model, where h is defined by α/ ≡ ∈ h(q) iff |α| ∈ h(q).
Then for any A we have:
Proof By induction on A.
1. For q atomic this holds by the definition of ≡.
The key case is that of →.
Assume α A → B, then for some β which is a legitimate extension of α we have β A and β B. But we also have in this case that α/ ≡ ρ β/ ≡ and by the induction hypothesis, β/ ≡ A and β/ ≡ B. Now assume α/≡ A → B. Then for some γ /≡ we have α/ ≡ ργ / ≡ and γ / ≡ A and γ / ≡ B. Therefore for some α 1 ≡ α and γ 1 ≡ γ we have γ 1 = α 1 * (t 1 , . . . , t k ) and γ 1 is a legitimate extension of α 1 . Hence since γ 1 ≡ γ , we get γ 1 /≡ A and γ 1 /≡ B. By the induction hypothesis we have γ 1 A and γ 1 B. Now look at the two models m α = (S, R α , |α|) and m α 1 = (S, R α 1 , |α 1 |). Since α 1 ≡ α, these two models are the same. So having γ 1 = α 1 * (t 1 , . . . , t k ) with γ 1 A and γ 1 B in m γ 1 implies that for δ = α * (t 1 , . . . , t k ) we also have δ A adn δ B in m α . Hence α A → B in m. Fig. 8 below, then there exist sequences of points from S of the form 
Corollary 3.4 The proof of Lemma 3.2 actually gives us a stronger result. Suppose we have a situation as described in
are all legitimate extensions of (a) and we have
In other words, Fig. 8 
from μ can be realised by actual continuous legitimate paths in m.
In fact, we can get a general result. Define in μ = ( , ρ, a/ ≡, h) the following immediate successor relation ρ 11 : Remark 3.5 (Folding reactive frames) We started with a reactive model m = (S, R, a, h) and converted it to a special model μ = ( , ρ, a/ ≡, h). This model is special and we want to highlight some of its properties.
First note that if m is finite then we can effectively derive μ from m in tractable time. This observation is important because we shall use μ to develop Beth tableaux for m.
We now examine μ more closely. The elements of are equivalence classes of legitimate sequences β of m. We have
• α ≡ β iff |α| = |β| and R α = R β .
Let m = (S, R, a, h). Let T be the set of all legitimate sequences of m. We define two equivalence relations on T.
•
The relation ≡ is the intersection of the above two relations. So if E 1 , . . . , E k are all the ≈ equivalence subsets of T and D 1 , . . . , D m are all the ≈ R equivalence subsets of T, then the equivalence subsets of ≡ are all the different combinations of the form
Actually, if S = {s 1 , . . . , s k } then we can have
We have
Let us now look at the class E i , for fixed i. Let α = (a, t 1 , . . . , t r , e) and β = (a, s 1 , . . . , s r , e) be two elements of this class. We have |α| = |β| = e ∈ S. Let us ask: Are α, β also in the same class D j for some j? Well maybe they are, depending on whether R α = R β . We can regard ≈ also as an equivalence relation on = {T i, j }:
This means that for any α ∈ T i, j , β ∈ T m,n we have |α| = |β|.
But |α| = |β| means h(α) = h(β), since h(α) = h(|α|) and h(β) = h(|β|).
We can now view the model μ with ≈ as a model of the form
with an equivalence relation ≈ on and the commitment:
This model satisfies special properties, because we know that μ = ( , ρ, a/ ≡, ≈) arises from a model m = (S, R, a) through a special construction.
We would like to list these special properties so that we can prove that any model μ with these properties comes from some reactive model m.
We believe that this is possible to do.
Conjecture 3.6 It is possible to give conditions on ρ and ≈ of a folded Kripke model which ensure it is equivalent to a reactive Kripke model (without ≈).
Example 3.7 (Fig. 6) We saw that the reactive Kripke frame of Fig. 6 can be presented as the folded Kripke frame of Fig. 7 . We have in Fig. 7 : (t, (t, t) ), ((t, t) , (t, t))} and we have t ≈ (t, t).
Remark 3.8
Let us see what is the status of folded Kripke frames in terms of Heyting algebras. An ordinary Kripke frame m = ( , ρ) gives rise to a free Heyting algebra H m . When we add an equivalence relation ≈ to form μ = ( , ρ, ≈) we are adding some equalities among the free generators of H m . These equalities generate a congruence relation on H m . If we let H μ = H m / then we get the algebra corresponding to μ. It is not a free algebra.
Reactive tableaux
We begin by explaining the intuitive idea of tableaux for reactive logics. Consider the tableau of Fig. 9 The label of the tableau is t. This is usually the name of the possible world we are dealing with. A is on the left and so we want to make t A and C → D is on the right hand side of the tableau, so we want to make t C → D. To do the latter we need an accessible world s. such that t R * s and s A and s B. This means that we move into the following tableau in Fig. 10 A carries on into s and in s, we put C on the left and D on the right. 4 This is the usual tableau process for intuitionistic logic. If we have ∧ and ∨ in the language, we might get different alternatives (tableau splitting). Let us assume our language contains only → so that we can concentrate on the differences between ordinary tableaux and reactive tableaux, without the complexity generated by the presence of ∧ and ∨.
In the case of pre-reactive semantics of Definition 2.3 the tableau will have labels α, β which are paths. So t = α and s = β. This is not an essential difference. The difference is essential in the reactive case because we must require that β is a legitimate extension of α. To do that we must record what R β is.
So to simplify even further and allow us to present the essential ideas of the reactive tableau let us assume our logic has a fixed finite reactive frame, (S, R, a).
In this case we get the following simplifications:
(S1.) Since the frame is finite and for any legitimate sequence β, R β is smaller than R, there is only a finite number of frames (S, R i ), i = 1, . . . , n, that are at play, (S2.) We can move to the finite folded Kripke frame μ = ( , ρ, ≈, a) and do our tableaux on μ. This is significantly simpler because μ is like an ordinary Kripke frame with the additional simple condition (simple from the tableaux point of view) imposed by ≈.
The next definition gives the notion of Beth tableaux for the implicational fragment. Note three facts:
Fact 1 Every wff can be put in the form
where q is atomic and each A i is of the same form as E.
Fact 2 We need only two tableaux rules:
• To make E false (E on the right) at world t, find a world s such that tρs and put all A i on the left and q on the right.
• To make E true on the left at t when q is on the right at t, we must move one of A i to the right of t to make A j false.
Proof Modify a proof for the case of an ordinary intuitionistic frame.
Definition 4.3 (Beth tableau for reactive Kripke frame)
Let m = (S, R, a) be a reactive frame. Let μ = ( , ρ, ≈) be the folded frame effectively obtained from m. Let A be a wff for which we seek a counter model. Execute the algorithm of Definition 4.1.
If an assignment h is found which falsifies A in μ, then the corresponding assignment h is found which falsifies A in μ, then the corresponding assignment h will falsify A in m. If the tableaux is closed and no such assignment exists, then no such assignment exists in m. Thus the logic of m can be characterised using tableaux. Given a class K of finite reactive frames then the logic of K can be characterised as the intersection of the logics of its members. See Footnote 3.
